Analogical Inference in Hume\u27s Philosophy of Religion by Jacquette, Dale
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 2 Issue 3 Article 6 
7-1-1985 
Analogical Inference in Hume's Philosophy of Religion 
Dale Jacquette 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Jacquette, Dale (1985) "Analogical Inference in Hume's Philosophy of Religion," Faith and Philosophy: 
Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 2 : Iss. 3 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol2/iss3/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
ANALOGICAL INFERENCE IN HUME'S 
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 
Dale lacquette 
The whole earth, believe me, Philo, is cursed and polluted. 
-Demea 
David Hume, in his philosophical writings on religion, is often guarded and 
ambiguous about his own religious beliefs. There is dispute over which if any 
of the characters in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion speaks for Hume.' 
To further complicate things, Hume' s published remarks about religion sometimes 
directly contradict his recorded pronouncements in private conversations with 
some of his contemporaries. 2 
But whether Hume was a deist, fideist, atheist, or agnostic, it is generally 
agreed that his empiricist philosophy of religion precludes the probability that 
an intelligent designer or designers of the universe could have human-like moral 
qualities. 3 Hume's God, if he exists, is demonstrably amoral, or at least amoral 
with respect to the welfare and happiness of his human creations. It is in part 
for this reason that Philo, the religious skeptic of the Dialogues, concludes that 
an intelligent designer of the universe would not be worthy of worship, but that 
the proper religious attitude is at most to be prepared to give a 'plain, philosophical 
assent to the proposition' that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably 
bear some remote analogy to human intelligence. 4 
II 
The cause of order in human inventions is the activity of an intelligent designer. 
Cleanthes, described by Pamphilus in the narrative introduction to Hume's 
dialogues as a thinker of 'accurate philosophical turn', appeals to the principle 
that like effects have like causes in order to support a version of the argument 
from design for the existence of God. The principle may be formulated schemat-
ically. 
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(PI) For any events x and y, if x is an effect produced by causes c] , ... 'Cn 
(n ~ 1), and y is an effect produced by causes C'I,'" ,c' n' then if x is 
similar to y, then c 1>'" 'Cn is probably proportionately similar to 
C'l,···,C'n o 
If the order in man-made devices is like the order in nature, then by this principle 
of analogical inference it follows that the order in the universe is also probably 
caused by the activity of a more perfect intelligent designer. 5 Cleanthes says to 
Philo and Demea: 
Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You 
will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an 
infinite number of lesser machines ... The curious adapting of means to 
ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, 
the productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wis-
dom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, 
we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also 
resemble, and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the 
mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned 
to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument 
a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the 
existence of a Deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence. 6 
But as Philo observes immediately thereafter, an analogical inference is weakened 
by every disanalogy. He maintains: " ... wherever you depart, in the least, from 
the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may 
at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and 
uncertainty ."7 The remaining dialogues are concerned in large part with a consid-
eration of dis analogies , and with the significance and limits of analogical inference 
in the argument from design. Philo concludes that an important disanalogy 
between man and the intelligent designer of the universe is that the latter probably 
does not have moral psychological properties. 
This result depends on empirical evidence about the seemingly needless suf-
fering and injustice in the world. It is related to what has traditionally been called 
the problem of evil. But in this particular application of the problem, Philo does 
not attempt to demonstrate an incompatibility in the divine properties of omnipo-
tence and perfect benevolence, but instead challenges the possibility of producing 
a valid analogical inference to the effect that the omnipotent intelligent designer 
of the universe could be perfectly benevolent, or, indeed, that the designer could 
have any moral qualities at all.' 
According to Philo, there are just four P9Ssibilities to be considered. The 
intelligent designer or designers causally responsible for order in the universe 
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may be (i) perfectly good; (ii) perfectly evil; (iii) both good and evil; (iv) neither 
good nor evil. But (i) and (ii) are contradicted by what Philo calls the mixed 
phenomena that there is both good and evil in the world. The third possibility 
in (iii) is also discounted, though for a somewhat unsatisfactory reason. Philo 
claims that if the intelligent designer or designers of the universe were both good 
and evil, then there would be an 'unsteadiness' or lack of uniformity in the 
natural or scientific laws by which the universe is governed, reflecting the battle 
between good and evil forces. But since this is not observed, the proposition 
that the intelligent designer or designers may be both good and evil is rejected. 
The only alternative is (iv), which states that the intelligent designer or designers 
are neither good nor evil but amoral. 9 
Here it is important to see that Philo's rejection of (iii) is premature and 
improperly motivated. Philo remarks: " .. .if we consider. .. the perfect uniformity 
and agreement of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks 
of a combat of malevolent with a benevolent being."!O But why should Hume 
or Philo assume that an opposition of good and evil moral natures in the intelligent 
designer or designers of the universe would necessarily manifest itself in a 
discordance of natural laws? Why should good and evil fight each other in the 
first place? And if they do, why not in the souls of men, where something like 
a conflict of good and evil is often experienced anyway? Philo might argue that 
if God or a committee of gods were both good and evil, then he or they would 
be unworthy of worship, and that only a perfectly benevolent intelligent designer 
of the universe could be an appropriate object of prayer, love and trust, or 
righteous fear. But this need not be because the designer is amoral. On the 
contrary, the possibility presented in (iii) seems more clearly to correspond to 
the expected result of the analogical inference involved in the argument from 
design. If like effects have like causes, then the cause of order in the universe 
alight to have a moral nature relevantly similar to the moral nature of the cause 
of order in human inventions-a mixture of good and evil. Hume's or Philo's 
attempt to refute the proposition is unsatisfactory, and reveals a surprising incon-
sistency in the application of the principles of analogical inference. 
III 
In addition to Cleanthes' principle that like effects have like causes, Philo 
offers the following rule: 
When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined 
together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see 
the existence of the other: And this I call an argument from experience. II 
Later, in Part VI of the Dialogues, he adds: 
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... there occurs to me another hypothesis, which must acquire an air of 
probability from the method of reasoning so much insisted on by 
Cleanthes. That like effects arise from like causes: This principle he 
supposes the foundation of all religion. But there is another principle 
of the same kind, no less certain, and derived from the same source of 
experience; that where several known circumstances are observed to be 
similar, the unknown will also be found similar. Thus, if we see the 
limbs of a human body, we conclude, that it is also attended with a 
human head, though hid from us. Thus, if we see, through a chink in 
a wall, a small part of the sun, we conclude, that were the wall removed, 
we should see the whole body. In short, this method of reasoning is so 
obvious and familiar, that no scruple can ever be made with regard to 
its solidity. 12 
Cleanthes' analogical inference principle (PI) can now be supplemented by 
Philo's analogical inference principle (P2). 
(P2) For any events or objects x and y, and any properties P and Q, if 
x is ordinarily observed to have property Q whenever it is observed to 
have property P, then if x is similar to y and y is observed to have 
property P, then probably y also has property Q. 
The degree of probability that may attach to analogical inferences supported by 
either (PI) or (P2) will be determined for the most part by the degree of similarity 
or relevant similarity between objects or events x and y. As Philo maintains, an 
analogical inference is only as strong as its weakest dis analogy . Hume in the 
person of Cleanthes or Philo does not elaborate further on the nebulous concept 
of similarity, which for present purposes may be regarded as undefined. (It is 
undoubtedly the least satisfactory element in the two principles, but also in a 
sense the most important.) 
If (P2) is assumed, then the following arguments involving Philo's principle 
can be advanced. They are presented together for the sake of comparison. 
(A) 1. Most every other time we have seen a pair of human limbs, it 
was accompanied by a human head. 
2. Here, then, is a pair of human limbs. 
3. Therefore, it is highly probable that these limbs are also accom-
panied by a human head. 
(B) 1. Most every other time we have seen the work of an intelligent 
designer, it was the work of a being who also had a moral nature. 
2. Here, then (indicating ostensively the universe as a whole or 
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some well-ordered, machine-like natural part of it), is the work of 
an intelligent designer. 
3. Therefore, it is highly probable that the universe is also the work 
of a being who has a moral nature. 
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Argument (A) is supposed to establish the probable existence of a human head 
accompanying a pair of human limbs, which alone are seen when the head is 
hidden from inspection. Argument (B) is offered with equal apparent justification 
as establishing the probable existence of some kind of moral nature accompanying 
any intelligence capable of causing order in the universe, where the psychological 
properties of the intelligent designer or designers are similarly hidden from 
inspection. 
The causes of machine-like artifacts in empirical experience are always beings 
that have both intelligence and moral attributes. From this, by an application of 
Philo's analogical inference principle (P2), in agreement with Cleanthes' analog-
ical inference principle (Pl), it may be concluded that the cause of order in the 
universe if probably an intelligent being with some sort of moral nature. The 
burden of proof accordingly lies with Hume to demonstrate that the moral nature 
of man is part of the disanalogy with the intelligent designer or designers. 
The problem of evil in Parts X and XI of the Dialogues may appear to provide 
the required disanalogy, but in fact it is inconclusive. The data of natural evil 
have no evidential priority over the data that intelligence capable of designing 
machinery is always accompanied by a moral psychology, and is never totally 
amoral. The problem of evil is alternatively resolved by admitting that although 
the intelligent designer probably has a moral nature, the intelligent designer is 
probably not both omnipotent and perfectly benevolent. The existence of evil 
does not entail that the intelligent designer is probably amoral, but only that the 
intelligent designer is probably not worthy of worship. But this could be true 
even (and especially) if the designer has human-like moral qualities. The problem 
of evil therefore cannot overturn the conclusion that the designer is probably 
moral. The consistent application of Hume' s principles of analogical inference 
suggest as a corollary to the argument from design that the intelligent designer 
or designers of the universe would also probably have a moral psychology. 
IV 
Philo, Cleanthes, and Demea agree to critically examine the argument from 
design, but only with the explicit understanding that the nature, not the existence, 
of God is open to dispute. 13 Even here Hume is careful to cast Philo's skepticism 
not as doubt about whether perfect benevolence is logically compatible with the 
presumed omnipotence of the intelligent designer in light of natural evil, but 
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instead as reluctance to concede that any moral properties of the designer can 
be inferred from the empirical evidence by the principles of analogical inference 
authorized in the argument from design. 14 Within these constraints, Hume attempts 
to undermine Enlightenment confidence in the argument as a relevantly significant 
foundation for religious practice and belief. 15 
It is easy to see why Hume might want to conclude that the intelligent designer 
is probably amoral rather than perfectly benevolent but not omnipotent, or partly 
good and partly evil. The philosophical theist described by Philo in the final 
sections of the dialogues is supposed to be dispassionate. 16 There is no particular 
difficulty in remaining dispassionate with respect to an intelligent omnipotent 
designer that has no human-like moral psychological qualities. But toward an 
intelligent designer or committee of designers that is good and evil, or perfectly 
benevolent but not omnipotent, the situation is very different. If the designer is 
moral, he may stand in ethical judgment of man. The possibilities of moral 
inter-relationships, duties, and obligations which then arise contradict Philo's 
implied rationale for the dispassionate attitude. God or the committee of gods 
might find the sins of man morally reprehensible, and punish or reward individuals 
for their conduct. It would make sense to pray to God or the gods for forgiveness 
or guidance in matters of ethical choice. The dispassionate attitude of the phil-
osophical theist who merely nods assent to the proposition that there is probably 
an intelligent designer of the universe would be unjustified. 
Hume's philosophy of religion therefore depends essentially on the moral 
dis analogy between human designers and the divine designer or designers. The 
inference version of the problem of evil is supposed to show that man cannot 
know whether God or the gods have any moral properties. But Philo's treatment 
of the problem does not establish the required moral disanalogy between God 
and man. The principles of analogical inference adduced by Cleanthes and Philo 
uphold instead the contrary conclusion that if there is an intelligent designer of 
the universe, then most probably the designer is not amoral, but has good, evil, 
or some combination of good and evil human-like moral psychological qualities. 17 
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